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Abstract
A group of friends organize their tennis games by submitting each their availability
over the weekdays. They want to obtain an assignment such that: each game must
be a double tennis match, i.e. requires four people, and nobody plays in a day he
is unavailable. Can we construct assignments that will always produce efficient, fair,
and envy-free outcomes? The answer is no, and extends to any sport that requires
any group size.
In the June 2016 edition of the magazine Mathematics Today, Maher (2016) described
an algorithm to assign tennis double matches among his circle of friends. The algorithm
takes as input the players availability for the weekdays, and maximizes the number of
tennis games, subject to three constraints: 1) no agent plays more than once per day, 2)
each match has exactly four players, and 3) no agent plays on a day he is not available.
The algorithm solves a linear program to maximize the number of games achieved
but the solution is generally not unique. Hence Maher selects among those the ones that
maximize the number of players that get at least one game. If several assignments remain,
then he chooses the ones that maximize the number of players that get at least two games.
In case uniqueness is yet not achieved, he selects one solution randomly among those, which
is the one implemented and communicated to each player. Maher writes “the (members
of the group) appear to trust in the fairness and efficiency of the algorithm”.
It is clear that the final assignment is efficient as it maximizes the number of matches.
But is it really fair? In the preferences that appear in Maher’s article, presented in Table
1 below for convenience, George StC declares to be available for 4 days - he is the most
flexible player as can play basically any day. However, he only gets one match: the final
assignment appears in brackets in Table 1. Six players (Barry T, Peter W, Colin C, Keith
B, Brian F, and Peter K) were all half as flexible as George StC and got twice as games
as him. George StC may argue the final assignment is treating him unfairly, and probably
most readers would agree with him. Furthermore, everybody except Gordon B has an
assignment at least as good as George StC.1
The property we described is a variant of game-theoretic envy-freeness (see Moulin
(1995)). This is, in the assignment presented in Table 1, George StC is envious of Barry
1This is a actually a simplification of Maher’s problem in which we do not consider individual quotas.
Table 1: Player’s availability from Prof. Maher’s tennis group.
Names Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Times
Barry T 0 0 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Tom B 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 3 (2)
Gordon B 0 0 0 0 1 (0) 1 (0)
Peter W 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 0 2 (2)
Colin C 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Mike M 0 1 (1) 1 (0) 1 (1) 1 (0) 4 (2)
Keith I 0 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 2 (1)
Alan C 1 (0) 0 0 1 (1) 0 2 (1)
John S 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Keith B 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 0 2 (2)
George StC 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 4 (1)
Michael L 0 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1)
Phil M 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Brian F 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 0 2 (2)
Peter K 0 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Willie McM 0 0 0 1 (1) 0 1 (1)
Ken L 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Total 7 10 6 8 2
T, who was less flexible but got more games, or envious of Peter W, because George StC
prefers his assignment. An algorithm that always produces envy-free assignment has an
important property: players do not want to fictitiously reduce their availability in order
to get more games. Just by one player misreporting his true availability, the assignment
described previously could change dramatically.
In this tennis assignment problem, that we describe formally below, players have di-
chotomous preferences over the days: either they want to play or they do not. These
preferences were first studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), and the preferences
here represent a natural extension of those: agents want to play in as many feasible days
as possible. However, any assignments that gives them a game on a day they are not
available is considered worse than having no games at all. Hence, players’ preferences can
be captured with a subset of all possible days. The constraints that 4 people are required
for a game has been previously imposed by Shubik (1971) over assignments of one day
only. This note is the natural extension of these two environments.
1. Model
Let A∗ be a n×m binary matrix containing the preferences of each person i = (1, . . . , n)
about playing on day j = (1, . . . ,m); the entry a∗ik = 1 if person i is available to play
on day k and 0 otherwise. A∗ will be called a tennis problem and represents the players’
preferences, who are indifferent about their game partners and just care about the days
in which they play.
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A matrix A∗ can be reduced to a matrix A by deleting all days when there are not
enough people available to create even one match, as in Friday in Table 1. A further
reduction can be performed by eliminating people that are not available on any remaining
days. The days and players which are eliminated are irrelevant for the type of solutions
we will consider, and hence we will work from now on with the corresponding irreducible
tennis problem A. Formally, an irreducible problem A satisfies:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
m∑
k=1
aik ≥ 1 (1)
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
n∑
i=1
aik ≥ 4 (2)
A solution to A is a binary matrix X(A), whose elements have the same interpretation
as in A, satisfying the following constraints:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, aik = 0 =⇒ xik = 0 (3)
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(∑
i
xik
)
mod 4 = 0 (4)
There are three types of conditions we look for: efficiency, fairness, and strong envy-
freeness. We look at them in that order.
Definition 1. An assignment X is efficient if there is no assignment X ′ such that∑
i
∑
k x
′
ik >
∑
i
∑
k xik.
Efficient assignments are exactly those that are Pareto optimal, i.e. those in which
no player can be made better off without hurting another one. The next one property
considers the games received by the individual in the society who is in the worst position,
then the ones received by the second worst one, and so on, in the spirit of John Rawls’
leximin criterion.
Definition 2. Let Gq(X) denote the number of rows in X such that
∑
k xik ≥ q, for any
integer q: this is the number of players with at least q games. An assignment X is fairer
than another assignment X ′ if there exists an integer q for which Gq(X) > Gq(X
′) and
for any integer q′ < q, Gq(X) = Gq(X
′). An assignment X is fair if there is no other
assignment which is fairer.
This notion of fairness implies an optimality condition: while we can construct assign-
ments that are efficient but not fair, every fair assignment is efficient (otherwise another
match could be created giving some people more matches, contradicting the fairness prop-
erty). Finally we have a variant of envy-freeness.
Definition 3. An assignment X is strongly envy-free if for any two players i, j with∑
k aik >
∑
j ajk, we have
∑
k xik ≥
∑
k xjk.
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Strong envy-freeness captures the idea that more flexible people should not be penalized
by the assignment. Strong envy cannot arise from days on which only the envious person
is available to play, as we are working with the corresponding irreducible tennis problem.
It is called strong because standard envy-freeness means that nobody prefers someone’s
else schedule, a property which is clearly too hard to satisfy in this case.
2. An Impossibility Result
There are tennis problems that admit no solutions that is strongly envy-free and efficient.
Table 2: The impossibility of strong EF and efficient assignments.
Names Mon Tues Wed Thur Frid Times
a 1 1 0 0 0 2
b 1 1 0 0 0 2
c 1 1 0 0 0 2
d 1 1 0 0 0 2
e 0 0 1 1 1 3
f 0 0 1 1 1 3
g 0 0 1 1 1 3
h 0 0 1 1 1 3
i 0 0 1 1 1 3
j 0 0 1 1 1 3
k 0 0 1 1 1 3
Total 4 4 7 7 7
In the tennis assignment problem in Table 2 there are eleven players. Note that by
efficiency, we need to organize five games, one each day. This implies that players a, b,
c, and d get two games. Then, for whatever way we assign the remaining players to the
games on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, one of the agents f to k gets at most one
game while he has an availability of three, so he is envious of any player with availability
two. This shows the aforementioned impossibility.
One may think of assignments for other sports. For example, a game of poker that
requires three players exactly. Or an indoor football match that requires 10 players. In
general, let a q-sport assignment problem be the one that requires q agents per day, with
the tennis assignment problem being its particular case when q = 4. A simple modification
of the example in Table 2 shows that our previous conclusion generalizes for arbitrary q-
sport assignment problems (although for q = 2 one needs to add more days). This is
Theorem 1. For any integer q ≥ 2, there exists q-sport assignment problems which have
no solution that is efficient and strongly envy-free (henceforth no solution that is fair and
strongly envy-free).
While we obtained a negative result, we leave many questions unanswered regarding
how to construct optimal tennis assignments. We note that this assignment problem,
despite being very simple, is close in spirit to the stable marriage problem proposed by
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Gale and Shapley (1962), which has led to the improvement of real-life assignments such
as those between colleges and students, organs and donors, or junior doctors and hospitals,
and for which Shapley received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012. Hence, this type of
problem, while simple, is always worth considering.
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